RELEASED IN PART 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CA-02 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-01 FBIE-00 FDRE-01 H-01 IMMC-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-08 L-01 ADS-00 MFLO-03 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OCS-06 M-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 FMP-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-09 G-00 /040W

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O 131716Z JUL 95
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3975
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 16724

ROME FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

LONDON FOR YOUNG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINS, RW, BY, FR

SUBJECT: RWANDA/BURUNDI COORDINATOR'S PARIS

CONSULTATIONS: TOWARD A REGIONAL POLITICAL

CONFERENCE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16724 01 OF 04 131715Z INFORMATION.

1.4(B)

2. SUMMARY. SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR RWANDA/BURUNDI BOGOSIAN, IN CALLS AT THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE), AND FOREIGN MINISTRY (QUAI) LEARNED OF FRANCE'S SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM OF ITS ACTIONS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI, ITS DESIRE TO AVOID RAISING TENSIONS IN EITHER COUNTRY, AND ITS ENTHUSIASM FOR A REGIONAL POLITICAL CONFERENCE IN THE REGION. END SUMMARY.

| 3. IN A JULY 11 CALL ON ELYSEE |
|--|
| AMBASSADOR RICHARD |
| BOGOSIAN, EMPHASIZED THE USG'S CONTINUED DISQUIET AT |
| THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI, ITS DESIRE FOR |
| CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT REGARDIN |
| THOSE COUNTRIES, AND THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM VIEW OF THE SITUATION THERE. |

ELYSEE SEEKS REGIONAL POLITICAL CONFERENCE

4. AFTER A PRELIMINARY COMMENT THAT FRANCE'S FIRST PRIORITY WAS ITS FORMER COLONIES RATHER THAN RWANDA OR BURUNDI, REPLIED THAT A SOUND APPROACH TO THE AREA'S PROBLEMS WOULD BE TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE IN THE LAKES REGION, A CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL REGIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS AS WELL AS OTHER INTERESTED STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS THE U.S., FRANCE, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UN THE OAU. HE SAID THAT THOUGHT SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 PARIS 16724 01 OF 04 131715Z GIVEN TO INVITING ZAIRE. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE AN APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR THE VATICAN TO PLAY, GIVEN THE FACT THAT BOTH RWANDA AND BURUNDI ARE OVERWHELMINGLY CATHOLIC.

5. THE GOAL OF SUCH A CONFERENCE, IN VIEW, WOULD BE TO WORK OUT NEW RULES FOR POLITICAL POWER-SHARING AND GUARANTEES AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, BECAUSE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE FORMULAE AND ELECTORAL PROCESSES WHICH HAD BEEN IN

| PLACE SINCE INDEPENDENCE HAVE NOT WORKED. WITHOUT |
|---|
| SOMETHING OF THIS NATURE, TUTSI DOMINATION OF THE |
| REGION WOULD BECOME A FACT, AND THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE |
| AND REVENGE THAT HAD CHARACTERIZED THE REGION SO LONG |
| WOULD BE BOUND TO REPEAT ITSELF. ALL POLITICAL ACTORS |
| IN THE REGION, INCLUDING BURUNDI TUTSI LEADER BAGAZA |
| AND RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME, SHOULD BE INVITED; |
| "NONE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED", HE STRESSED. THE INCENTIVE |
| FOR REGIONAL PARTICIPATION. THE BEST WAY FOR THIS TO |
| WORK WOULD BE TO CHANNEL ALL ASSISTANCE MULTILATERALLY, |
| RATHER THAN BILATERALLY. THIS, HE OPINED, WOULD IN ANY |
| EVENT BE LESS EXPENSIVE THAT THE COSTS OF A MILITARY |
| INTERVENTION. THE PENALTY FOR NON-COOPERATION ON THE |
| PART OF ANY OF THE REGIONAL PLAYERS, SUGGESTED, 1.4(B) |
| SHOULD BE COMPLETE INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION: THE |
| INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD DECLINE TO HAVE ANY |
| FURTHER DEALINGS WITH THOSE WHO AVOID THE CONFERENCE. |
| |
| 6. SAID THAT THE OAU WAS READY TO SEEK SUCH A |
| CONFERENCE, AND OPINED THAT UN SECRETARY GENERAL |
| BOUTROS-GHALI WAS READY AS WELL. HE FELT STRONGLY THAT |
| CONFIDENTIAL |

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THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND
THE OAU, AND THAT THE FORMER SHOULD ISSUE INVITATIONS.
HE SUGGESTED THAT TWO OR THREE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS
(NOTE: HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHICH THIRD MEMBER HE HAD IN
MIND) SHOULD BEGIN TO PRESSURE BOUTROS-GHALI IN THIS
DIRECTION.

FRENCH RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

G-00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3976 INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

/040W

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 16724

ROME FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

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| 7. | IN RESPONSE TO BOGOSIAN'S Q | QUERY, 1.4(B) |
|----|-----------------------------|---------------|
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| PAGE 02 PARIS 16724 02 OF 04 131715Z |
|---|
| CHARACTERIZED FRANCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BOTH RWANDA |
| AND BURUNDI AS COMPLEX, BUT STRESSED THAT FRANCE'S |
| CLOSEST RELATIONS WERE MORE WITH ITS FORMER COLONIES. |
| WITH REGARD TO AFRICA MORE GENERALLY, SAID THERE |
| WAS NO CLEAR SUCCESSOR TO HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY AS "DEAN" OF |
| FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS, AND OPINED THAT THIS |
| WAS PERHAPS NOT SUCH A BAD DEVELOPMENT: IT FORCES EACH |
| PRESIDENT TO TAKE ON MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS |
| ACTIONS. HE NONETHELESS SAW THE GRADUAL COALESCENCE OF |
| A SORT OF "COLLEGE OF GODFATHERS" AMONG AFRICAN |
| PRESIDENTS IN FRANCE'S FORMER COLONIES; HE MENTIONED |
| DIOUF OF SENEGAL, KONARE OF MALI AND LISSOUBA OF CONGO |
| IN THIS CATEGORY. WHEN BOGOSIAN ASKED WHETHER SOGLO OF |
| BENIN (WHO HAD JUST VISITED PARIS) WERE AMONG THESE, |
| SHRUGGED AND SAID "MAYBE". |
| |

FRENCH MISTRUST, DISDAIN BOTH NGOS AND MEDIA

8. IN DISCUSSING THE ROLE OF NGOS AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS IN THE REGION, EXCLAIMED SARCASTICALLY, "LONG LIVE THE NGOS; BUT THEY ARE JUST NOT IN THE SAME LEAGUE AS SOVEREIGN STATES". HE ADDED THAT THE GOF IS MISTRUSTFUL OF THE MEDIA, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE PRESS HAD RECENTLY GOTTEN IN THE HABIT OF "DEVOURING" THE GOF. HE SAID THAT THE GOF HOLDS BOTH THE PRESS AND THE NGO COMMUNITY "AT ARM'S LENGTH".

QUAI: YOUR FEARS ARE OUR FEARS

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| PAGE 03 PARIS 16724 02 OF 04 131715Z | |
| 9. IN HIS JULY 11 CALL ON 1.46 | (B) |
| BOGOSIAN ALSO STRESSED USG CONCERNS AT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI AND THE USG DESIRE FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE ON THESE MATTERS, CITING THE SECRETARY'S RECENT MESSAGE TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER. BEGAN HER REPLY BY STATING THAT FRANCE SHARED MANY OF THE PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. SHE OBSERVED THAT BURUNDI HAD BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY REGULAR AND RECURRING EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE THE HUTU ELITES SINCE 1962. SHE THEN CHARACTERIZED FRANCE AS THE VICTIM OF CERTAIN NGOS, PARTICULARLY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHICH, SHE SAID, CRITICIZE FRANCE FOR DOING NOTHING ON THE ONE HAND AND OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO RWANDAN EXILES ON THE OTHER, NEITHER OF WHICH IS TRUE. | |
| BURUNDI: ARMS SANCTIONS, DEMINING | |
| STRESSED THAT FRANCE FULLY SUPPORTED THE NOTION OF OBSERVERS BEING POSTED IN REGIONAL AIRPORTS TO DETER ARMS TRAFFICKING, BUT THAT WITH THE AMOUNT OF ARMS ALREADY IN THE REGION, AND THE PORTABILITY OF ARMS OVERLAND, THIS WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT. SHE SAID THAT FRANCE OBSERVED A DE FACTO ARMS EMBARGO ON BURUNDI, AND WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON RWANDA. SHE FELT LIFTING THE EMBARGO ON RWANDA WOULD SERVE ONLY TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF TENSIONS THERE. | |

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PAGE 04 PARIS 16724 02 OF 04 1317152 NEVERTHELESS, FRANCE WOULD FULLY SUPPORT AN EXCEPTION TO THE RWANDAN ARMS EMBARGO FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPORTING DEMINING EXPLOSIVES, AND WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THIS MIGHT EVEN BE PERMISSIBLE UNDER EXISTING U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

| STILL | OPPOSING | INTERVENTION | PLANNING |
|-------|----------|--------------|----------|
|-------|----------|--------------|----------|

1.4(B)ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE HAD

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O 131716Z JUL 95 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3977 INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 PARIS 16724

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NOT BEEN OF ENTIRELY THE SAME VIEW AS TO THE BEST WAY CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16724 03 OF 04 131716Z TO PROCEED IN BURUNDI IN RECENT MONTHS, AND THAT FRANCE STILL BELIEVED THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION PLANNING WAS UNWISE BECAUSE IT WOULD BECOME KNOWN AND WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF WORSENING THE SITUATION, NOT CALMING IT. SHE THEN REITERATED THAT A GENERAL DEGRADATION OF THE SITUATION WOULD CERTAINLY SPARK AN (UNSPECIFIED) RESPONSE FROM FRANCE. (NOTE: SEPARATELY, A

1.4(B)

REASSURED US JULY 10

THAT FRANCE WOULD STILL CONTEMPLATE MILITARY

INTERVENTION IN SUCH A SITUATION. END NOTE).

FRENCH ACTIONS IN BURUNDI

12. AFTER MENTIONING THE EFFORTS OF THE FORMER FRENCH
COOPERATION MINISTER TO GET THE PARTIES TALKING LAST
APRIL, MENTIONED THE POLITICAL DECISION OF
FRANCE TO FREEZE PART OF ITS MILITARY COOPERATION AS A
REACTION TO THE KAMENGE MASSACRES. SHE FELT THAT THE
ARMY WAS INDEED BEHAVING BETTER DESPITE THE PRESSURE
UPON IT FROM POLITICAL EXTREMISTS. FRANCE CONTINUES TO
TRAIN THE USI (UNITE DE SECURITE DES INSTITUTIONS)
WHICH PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR SENIOR POLITICAL
FIGURES. SHE STRESSED THAT FRANCE'S GOAL REMAINS ONE
OF REDUCING TENSIONS, AND THAT RESULTS CAN BE OBTAINED
WITH SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

STABILITY FACTORS IN BURUNDI

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PAGE 03 PARIS 16724 03 OF 04 131716Z OPINED THAT THE TUTSI-BASED UPRONA PARTY IN 1.4(B)BURUNDI FEELS ENDANGERED BY HUTU EXTREMISTS, WHILE THE HUTUS HAVE ACQUIRED THE HABIT OF SEEKING FOREIGN SUPPORT. IN RESPONSE TO BOGOSIAN'S QUESTION AS TO HOW 1.4(B)THE SITUATION MIGHT WORSEN, STATED THAT SHE FELT THE ARMY MIGHT KILL IF IT FELT ITSELF ENDANGERED, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO UNDERTAKE GENERALIZED KILLINGS SINCE THE HUTU AND TUTSI POPULATIONS OF BURUNDI ARE NOW MOSTLY PHYSICALLY SEPARATED. WHILE AGREEING GENERALLY WITH BOGOSIAN'S POINT ABOUT THE NEED TO HAVE WITNESSES TO THE SITUATION, SHE NOTED THAT OBSERVERS THEMSELVES NEED PROTECTION.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

14. IN RESPONSE TO BOGOSIAN'S QUESTION ABOUT FRANCE'S POSITION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,

REPLIED THAT FRANCE'S INTERNAL LEGISLATION TO
PROVIDE FOR COOPERATION WITH THE TRIBUNAL WOULD HAVE TO
WAIT UNTIL THE TRIBUNAL ADOPTED ITS OWN INTERNAL RULES
OF PROCEDURE. ONCE THE COURT ADOPTS SUCH RULES, FRANCE
COULD ENACT A LAW FAIRLY QUICKLY, AS IT DID IN THE CASE
OF THE TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. SHE ALSO
NOTED THAT FRANCE BELIEVED THAT THE TRIBUNAL SHOULD BE
FINANCED NOT BY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, BUT OUT OF THE
REGULARLY ASSESSED OBLIGATORY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN.

1.4(B)

HATE RADIO

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15. AS A FINAL POINT, RAISED THE ISSUE OF
"RADIO NYANGAMA", WHICH SHE SAID BORE A DISTURBING
RESEMBLANCE TO "LA RADIO DES MILLE COLLINES" HATE
BROADCASTS. SHE FOUND ITS APPEARANGE TROUBLESOME, BUT
SAID FRANCE DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR NOTION AS TO HOW BEST
TO PROCEED.

16. COMMENT. AMBASSADOR BOGOSIAN'S VISIT SERVED TO MOVE OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH ON BURUNDI FORWARD A GREAT DEAL. THE MAIN NEW POINT WAS THE ELYSEE'S

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3978
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 16724

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EVIDENT ENTHUSIASM FOR A REGIONAL CONFERENCE. THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PARIS 16724 04 OF 04 131716Z PAGE 02 ELYSEE PROPOSAL CONTAINS MUCH FOOD FOR THOUGH, AND A NUMBER OF PITFALLS AS WELL. SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD SERVE MOSTLY TO FURTHER AND INAPPROPRIATELY REHABILITATE MOBUTU. CHANNELING ASSISTANCE THROUGH STRICTLY THROUGH MULTILATERAL CHANNELS MIGHT BE INTENDED, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, TO PROVIDE FRANCE WITH A PREPONDERANT VOICE ON WHATEVER COMES OUT OF THE CONFERENCE. THE UP-FRONT GUARANTEES APPARENTLY ENVISAGED BY THE FRENCH MIGHT INVOLVE AID COMMITMENTS THAT THE USG IS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PROVIDE. 1.4(B)PROPOSAL NEVERTHELESS PROVIDES A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO FIND A COMMON GROUND WITH AFRICA'S LARGEST AID DONOR AND TO INFLUENCE THE PROPOSALS BEFORE THEY ARE SET IN CONCRETE. THO PROPOSAL HAS APPARENTLY NOT BEEN FULLY STAFFED OUT WITHIN THE GOF, AS EVIDENCED BY THE QUAI SILENCE ON THE ISSUE.

HARRIMAN

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